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Davids Against Goliath? Collective Identities and  
the Market Success of Peripheral Organizations during Resource Partitioning 
Abstract 
This paper contributes to the sociology of markets literature by arguing that collective identities 
sustain the market success of peripheral producers during the process of resource partitioning. Two 
conditions underlie the positive returns obtained by peripheral producers from their identity claims. 
First, the demise of near-center producers crystallizes the difference among classes of organizations 
which benefits the market success of peripheral producers. Second, individual peripheral producers 
that face an audience that values their identity claims and exhibit credible engagement with their 
claimed identity, encounter greater market success. Our contributions to the literature are discussed. 
Key words: resource partitioning, producers’ identities, and audience preferences  
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Introduction  
Resource partitioning theory (Carroll, 1985) depicts economic action as socially situated, a 
conception widely held in the sociology of markets literature (Smesler & Swedberg, 1994; Smesler & 
Swedberg, 2005; Fligstein & Dauter, 2007). The theory proposes a robust explanation for the co-
existence of a few center market players and many peripheral organizations in mature industries. 
Competition for scale economies among market leaders, coupled with the existence of diverse and 
unmet preferences among consumers, feed the market success of peripheral organizations.  
This rationale has been tested in various settings (Carroll et al., 2002) and was recently 
enriched by reflections concerning the benefits obtained by peripheral producers from their collective 
identity. Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) were the first to highlight collective identities as benefitting 
peripheral producers – above and beyond the returns generated by market concentration. The faith of 
consumers in authentic producers and the status spillovers accruing from the consumption of 
sophisticated products emerged as additional reasons to justify the market success of peripheral 
producers. McKendrick and Hannan (2013) further confirm that the distinct identity of peripheral 
producers protects them from being subject to attack by dominant organizations within the industry.  
A thorough understanding of the conditions under which a collective identity sustains the 
market success of peripheral producers, holds the promise of qualifying received wisdom about 
market concentration as the primary mechanism of resource partitioning. Unfortunately, research on 
the identity mechanism falls short on three accounts. First, a focus on producers’ identities requires 
placing audience members (i.e., consumers and other relevant stakeholders) at the center of our 
theorizing. From this perspective, market concentration alone cannot be responsible for sustaining the 
identity mechanism.  Clear lines of demarcation among classes of producers are required. However, 
our understanding of the conditions under which such distinctions are crystallized in the eyes of 
audience members remains limited. Second, current research presumes the existence of a peripheral 
audience marked by distinct preferences, but fails to acknowledge the extent to which the matching of 
audience member preferences is a key source of variation in the returns obtained by peripheral 
producers from a claimed identity.  Finally, existing research is unable to distinguish between the 
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effects of  “preferences for the identity of producers” and those related to “preferences for products” 
or to “status consumption” (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000).  
This paper aims to fill these gaps and advance our understanding of how peripheral producers 
leverage their clams of distinctiveness during the resource partitioning process. To achieve this goal, 
we conceptualize collective identities as resting on the beliefs and perceptions of audience members 
(Hannan et al., 2007; Pólos et al., 2010). We then elaborate on the failure of near-center players (i.e., 
of mid-sized firms) as contributing to the success of peripheral organizations by crystallizing identity 
distinctions among classes of producers. To deepen our understanding of the organizational 
differences in the returns obtained from a collective identity, we argue that individual peripheral 
producers that (i) encounter an audience that values their identity claims, and; (ii) exhibit credible 
engagement with their claimed identity are expected to achieve greater market success.  
To distinguish the consequences induced by the “preferences for the identity of producers” 
from those associated with  “preferences for products” or  “status consumption”, we locate our study 
in an empirical setting marked by homogeneous products and non-public consumption: the German 
electricity industry after deregulation. As market deregulation called for a collective effort from 
peripheral producers (i.e., from municipal utilities, henceforth MUs), a focus on the years after 
deregulation allows exploration of the conditions under which the identity claims of peripheral 
players meet market success. As the market success of MUs primarily concerned incumbent 
organizations, we frame our hypotheses with respect to organizational growth rates. As the theoretical 
development is anchored in the empirical context, the next section introduces the reader to our setting. 
The Empirical Setting 
The German electricity retail market after deregulation represents an ideal context in which to 
study the effects of organizational identities during resource partitioning. As in many other 
commodity markets, strong scale economies due to large sunk costs coexist with decreasing 
transmission and distribution costs (Christensen and Greene, 1976; Thompson 1997). In addition, the 
perceived homogeneity of electricity hinders the development of distinct preferences among audience 
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members. Thus, product differentiation is negligible in this market – compared, for instance, with beer 
or wine – and organizational identities may be the primary source of distinction among producers.   
The empirical counterparts of peripheral organizations in the German electricity market are 
MUs. MUs in Germany have a long history. Since the late 19th century, the urbanization of German 
cities has been prompted by concern for residents’ wellbeing and the local authorities started to 
provide gas, electricity, heating, water supply and such services as sewage, waste removal and public 
transport through local MUs.  In providing these services, local authorities acted in the interests of 
"the common good of the local community" (Wollmann, 2002). The surpluses generated by the 
profitable aspects of the MUs like electricity, gas and water supply, were used to cross-subsidize the 
deficits incurred by public transportation or sport facilities (Wollman, 2002; Püttner, 1999: 543) and 
reinvested in kindergartens, schools and maintenance of local streets.  
Before deregulation in 1998, approximately 900 electricity suppliers served German end users 
in regional monopolies defined by the demarcation agreements (Die Welt, 1998). The 
Energiewirtschaftsgesetz of 1935 established geographically demarcated monopoly rights (Padgett, 
1990; Monstadt, 2004). The demarcation agreements guaranteed each utility the exclusive rights to 
serve all end users located within a specified geographical area ― being one or  more municipalities 
within a county; one or multiple regions within a federal state; or even involved several federal states. 
As a result, a three level system evolved in Germany (Monstadt, 2004: 82-84). First, the eight supra-
regional utilities (the “Big Eight” or Verbundunternehmen) generated over 80% of German electricity 
and served about 1/3 of the end users, extending their operations across several federal states. Second, 
around 80 regional utilities distributed electricity to lower level suppliers such as MUs and served 
about 1/3 of the end users, mainly restricting their activities within a federal state. Some regional 
utilities were connected to the “Big Eight” through minority shareholding, although most of them 
were legally separate organizations and also had a separate trade body. Last, more than 700 MUs 
served end users in their municipalities (BDEW, 1998). MUs were owned by municipalities and 
restricted their operations to one or more municipalities within a given county. Besides the supra-
regional, regional utilities and MUs, the population of electricity suppliers includes a small number of 
   
 
 5 
cooperatives and private firms, usually small in size. Because of the difficulties surrounding 
systematic data collection from this latter group of small firms, we have excluded them from our 
empirical study. 
To develop an internal market for electricity, the European Union (EU) introduced the 
Electricity Directive in 1996. Following its introduction, the EU member states started to deregulate 
their national electricity markets. In 1998, Germany opened its electricity market to competition  
meaning that all end users could purchase electricity from any supplier in the market. Before 
deregulation, many experts expected high mortality rates among the MUs because of the strong 
economies of scale witnessed in this market (Die Welt, 1998; 1999). Indeed, since 1998, market 
concentration has increased considerably (German Monopoly Commission, 2007). In particular, from 
1998 to 2002, the “Big Eight” became the “Big Four” (E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall Europe) 
and began to operate nationwide (thereafter NWUs for nationwide utilities). Out of the original 80 
regional utilities recorded in 1998, half of them have been fully or partially absorbed by NWUs. Many 
regional utilities have also changed their names to adopt the new strong corporate identity. For 
example, Hanseatische Energieversorgung became part of E.ON Edis and Energieversorgung 
Oberfranken became part of E.ON Bayern. Eventually, the demise of the regional utilities was sealed 
in 2002 by the merge of their trade body with that of the supra-regional utilities.  
MUs reacted to this competitive threat by reinforcing their collective identity. For instance, as 
the marketing manager of the MU cooperation group “Local Energy” (established in 1999) revealed, 
“Uncertainty prevailed. As the first newcomers came to the market, for example, Yello (a subsidiary 
of an NWU). We were totally flustered … (laugh). Then very quickly, we formed with other municipal 
utilities, hmm, let me say, our Yello-rival association… ”. Cooperation agreements among MUs and 
substantial support from end users prevented the widely anticipated death of the MUs. Instead, “a 
renaissance of municipal utilities” emerged (Die Welt, 2010): hardly any MUs exited the market and 
several new foundings took place. Overall, the aggregated retail market share of MUs increased from 
33% in 1997 to 40% in 2006 (VKU, 2007). Currently, MUs enjoy a good reputation and the loyalty of 
their customers (Die Welt, 2009). The surprising strength of the MUs has been widely discussed in 
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the mass media (Financial Times Deutschland, 2008; Frankfurter Rundschau, 2009; Die 
Tageszeitung, 2010). In the next section, we elaborate on the conditions that facilitated the market 
success of MUs. First, we review the existing literature on resource partitioning. Next, we advance a 
novel set of hypotheses anchored in the empirical setting we just described. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Inspired by Carroll’s seminal study on the U.S. newspaper industry (1985), resource 
partitioning explains the co-existence of large center players (generalists) with the small, thriving 
peripheral producers (specialists). The theory hinges on several assumptions, it presumes: (i) the 
existence of heterogeneous audience preferences and of a clear peak in the distribution of preferences 
― i.e., of a high concentration of resources; (ii) the market is divided into center, near-center and 
peripheral positions, each served by a respective group of producers; (iii) resources as finite and 
niches overlap across neighboring segments: while center and peripheral forms do not overlap each 
other, near-center producers overlap with both center and peripheral producers; (iv) scale advantages 
do exist in the market jointly with; (v) scope limitations – i.e., “restrictions on the range of 
preferences to which any one producer can appeal” (Reis et al., 2013: 6).  
Under these assumptions, the theory predicates the following. Initially, a group of producers 
competes for resources (i.e., customers), while slightly differentiating from each other. Under the 
effect of scale-based competition, the smaller organizations exit the market, while surviving ones 
grow larger and move towards the market center. The market periphery is not exploited by market 
center producers who offer generic products and focus on the most bountiful portion of the market. As 
a result, differentiated organizations emerge to fulfil the unmet demands of the market periphery. By 
targeting different market locations, market center and peripheral producers do not directly compete 
and the market is therefore partitioned.  
The basic prediction of resource partitioning is that increasing market concentration leads to 
improved prospects for peripheral producers. Empirical support for resource partitioning has been 
obtained from a wide variety of industries such as banking, airline, beer brewing, wine making, 
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newspaper, auditing and car manufacturing (Carroll et al., 2002). Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) 
were the first to reflect on the additional benefits provided by the enactment of a collective identity by 
peripheral producers. The faith of consumers in small organizations and the status spillovers 
associated with the display of expert knowledge during the consumption of specialty products were 
argued to explain the positive returns gained by peripheral producers from their collective identity. 
The variation of social visibility among organizational sub-forms (i.e., brewpubs vs. contract 
breweries) was highlighted as relevant to interpret the heterogeneous returns from the collective 
identity gathered by peripheral organizations during resource partitioning (Carroll and Swaminathan, 
2000).  
We advance our understanding of the identity mechanism in two ways. First, we contend that 
the claims of distinctiveness of peripheral producers meet with greater market success, when a 
cognitive split among classes of organizations crystallizes in the eyes of audience members ― i.e., 
with the creation of “different” mental clusters in our minds (Zerubavel, 1996). This cognitive split is 
created by the failure of near-center producers which provides distinctiveness to the identity of 
peripheral producers (Pólos et al., 2010). Second, in alignment with recent research on organizational 
identities (Hsu et al., 2009; Hannan et al., 2007), we argue that the returns obtained by each 
organization from a collective identity remain contingent upon the endorsement of a target audience. 
Such endorsements are more easily achieved when there is a correspondence between the identity 
claims of the peripheral organization and the perceived value of the organization by its target 
audience, and in presence of the active engagement by the peripheral producer with the claimed 
identity.  
In the next section, we develop our hypotheses by leveraging the qualitative data collected 
from our fieldwork. In particular, we make use of (i) reports based on several large scale customer 
surveys which were funded by the umbrella trade association BDEW and the MU trade association 
VKU (BDEW household customer survey, 1999-2009; BDEW commercial customer survey 2000-
2009;TNS Emnid survey, 1999, 2003, 2005, 2009; ifm, 2006); (ii) 11 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews carried out with industry experts and a considerable number of unstructured interviews at 
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trade conferences or via telephone; (iii) the information collected via utilities’ customer magazines, 
promotional materials, German national and local newspapers.  
The Value of Distinctiveness: Competitive Release and the Consolidation of Distinct Identities 
As a clear distinction between market center and peripheral producers arises in the eyes of 
audience members it becomes easier for peripheral producers to reap the benefits of their collective 
identity. Thus, we argue that the claims of distinctiveness of peripheral organizations become more 
effective through the failure of near-center producers (Pólos et al., 2010). Thanks to the demise of 
near-center producers, the “perceived unity” of the market is disrupted (Hannan et al., 2007: 227): a 
cognitive “splitting” (Zerubavel, 1996; 1997) occurs and the distinct identity of peripheral producers 
compared to that of market leaders becomes apparent to audience members.  
Let us elaborate on this argument by returning to our empirical context. Recall, that the retail 
market for electricity was initially populated by NWUs (nationwide utilities), regional utilities and 
MUs (municipal utilities). Our fieldwork suggests that these types of organizations are valid 
counterparts of center, near-center and peripheral organizations. Qualitative evidence from the 
German electricity industry supports the connection between the demise of near-center producers and 
the consolidation of oppositional identities between NWUs and MUs. Figure 1 below, illustrates the 
evolution of the number of regional utilities from 1998 to 2008. Figure 2, marks the trend of 
perceived oppositional identities during the same period, based on our coding of a German national 
newspaper Die Welt (for a similar approach see Kennedy, 2008). As the distinctiveness of MUs 
hinged on the oppositional values endorsed by these organizations compared to those of market 
leaders, we aggregated the annual number of articles describing NWUs and MUs identities as 
oppositional and divided it by the total number of articles that co-mentioned NWUs and MUs.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 and 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Figure 1 and 2 suggest that the perceived difference between NWUs and MUs sharply 
increased with the failure of regional utilities. The first surge of perceived opposition occurred in 
1998-1999, coinciding with 12 regional utilities exiting the market. From 2000 to 2003, 27 of the 
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remaining 66 regional utilities exited the market, and the perception of oppositional identities 
increased. At the same time, market concentration rose as a result of mergers. The eight supra-
regional utilities became the Big Four NWUs, which then acquired a number of failed regional 
utilities. 
As the oppositional identities of center and peripheral firms reached a threshold, audiences 
started to perceive the market as partitioned along distinct organizational identities. A survey based on 
60 interviews carried out by psychologists in 2006 concluded that a “partitioned market picture” had 
already emerged (ifm, 2006: 59). Whereas, NWUs were described as embodying the omnipotent, 
uncontrollable, and abstract aspects of electricity, MUs lent a tangible and familiar face to electricity 
and were associated with a ‘cosy’ and pleasant, everyday life. The contrast between NWUs and MUs 
identities is vividly illustrated by the drawings of interviewees reported in Figure 3.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
The market returns obtained by peripheral producers from their distinct identity increased 
with the demise of regional utilities whose market location was between NWUs and MUs. Therefore, 
we argue that the beneficial effects accruing to peripheral organizations from competitive release are 
in addition to those elicited by market concentration (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000: 733). Building 
on this rationale, we propose the following hypothesis:  
H1. Net of market concentration, the larger the release of resources through the failure of regional 
utilities, the higher the growth rates of MUs.  
Leveraging the Identity Claims: Matching and Engagement 
The returns from the identity claims of peripheral producers are larger in the presence of an 
endorsement from a target audience combined with active engagement by producers with their 
claimed identity. Building on previous research that has explored the appeal of organizational 
identities (Hannan et al., 2007), we propose that peripheral organizations that (i) target audience 
members with preferences aligned to values associated with their identity and (ii) credibly engage 
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with that claimed identity are more likely to achieve greater market returns. The next section further 
elaborates on these arguments. 
Variations in identity matching 
Extant research on resource partitioning presumes the existence of a peripheral audience 
segment marked by distinct preferences. But it fails to theorize about the relevance of the match 
between producers and audience members for interpreting the variation in the success of peripheral 
producers. The endorsement of audience members becomes even more important when considering 
the returns obtained from collective identities. Matching the preferences of audience members matters 
when reaping identity benefits, because the material and symbolic support of audience members 
allows a producer “to thrive within its environment – to obtain necessary resources, to persist, and to 
grow” (Hannan 2010: 169). To capture the essence of matching in a context marked by localized 
production and consumption, we anchor the discussion of variations in values and preferences of 
audience members within geographical communities.  
In order to discuss the relevance of identity matching to audience preferences, the feature 
values of the MU’s identity ought to be introduced. According to a series of customer surveys (TNS 
Emnid, 1999; 2003; 2005; 2009), two main features differentiate the MUs identity from that of NWUs 
namely, localness and environmental friendliness. In these surveys, customers described MUs as 
associated with “orientation on the common welfare of the local region”, “support for the local 
region” as well as “environmental friendly behavior”. Issues of “supply security” and “reliability” 
also figured prominently in the perception of audience members, but appeared to be captured by the 
localness of MUs (ifm, 2006). In contrast, the NWUs were defined by “profit seeking”, “flexibility”, 
and “customer orientation” (Figure 4).  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
According to the TNS Emnid surveys (1999; 2003; 2005; 2009) localness emerged as the 
most prominent MU identity feature. As Figure 4 shows, 45% of the interviewees expect “orientation 
on the common welfare of the local region” and “support for the local region” from the MUs. 
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Conversely only 9% expressed similar views towards NWUs and other private utilities. This is 
consistent with the results of the ifm psychological survey (ifm, 2006). According to this survey MUs 
are a symbol of the community itself with which citizens strongly identify. Alternative offerings from 
the NWUs are perceived as an “assault” from the outside, attacking one’s own living space and 
should be fended off. It is therefore, unsurprising that attempts to privatize MUs are likened to  
“selling off family jewelry” (Tafelsilber in German) and have triggered referendums and 
demonstrations in several communities (Energie & Management, 2001; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2008). 
Local pride also led customers to attach emotions to electricity. As a customer of the MU Dresden 
proudly declared: “this is Dresdener electricity” (ifm, 2006). An energy expert further confirmed “the 
idea of ‘we are from here’ is very powerful” and associated this with the surprising vitality of MUs 
(Die Welt, 2010). Due to the strong emotional attachment to their MUs local customers disregarded 
market information. They showed no interest in alternative offerings and appeared relatively 
insensitive to price: they are willing to pay a bit more for “local” electricity and are tolerant toward 
price differences (ifm, 2006) even though it is technically impossible to discriminate between whether 
one receives “local” or “nonlocal” electricity.  
Environmental friendliness (‘Greenness’) is the second pivotal feature of the MU identity. 
Whereas 35% of the consumers associated environmental friendliness with MUs, only 8% of 
respondents associated ‘greenness’ with NWUs and other private utilities. The early years of the 
BDEW customer survey pointed out that both NWUs and MUs showed an image deficit in 
environmental friendliness and urged its members to react BDEW household customer survey, 1999; 
BDEW commercial customer survey, 2000). MUs started to provide energy saving tips in their 
customer magazines, built photovoltaic arrays on the roof of the local kindergarten and constructed 
environmental friendly combined heat and power (CHP) generation capacity. In contrast, even when 
actively portraying themselves as environmentally friendly  (Die Welt, 2001), NWUs’ efforts at 
reinforcing their ‘green’ image proved unsuccessful. The high percentage of electricity generated 
through coal plants and investments in nuclear power plants rendered their claims anything but 
authentic. Indeed, NWUs are called “nuclear utilities” (Der Spiegel, 2002; Financial Times 
Deutschland, 2010).  
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While the identity claims of every MU revolved around localness and greenness, variations in 
the endorsement of these feature values by their target audience explain the different market returns 
obtained by each MU from the collective identity. Questions may be raised on how MUs embedded in 
more supportive counties are able to sell more electricity. Considering that after deregulation MUs 
served a territory that proxies a county and that German counties include multiple municipalities or 
cities. MUs realized their growth in sales in two ways: high customer loyalty in home municipalities 
and new customer acquisition in neighboring municipalities, often within the same county and usually 
within the same federal state. While the first way is rather straightforward, the second requires 
clarification. While some municipalities had their own MUs, others did not and were supplied either 
by regional utilities or the supra-regional ones before deregulation. After deregulation, a large number 
of regional utilities were acquired by NWUs. Several customers, witnessed their regional utilities 
became a local branch of the NWUs and experienced the changing of the traditional regional names 
for corporate ones, expressed a decreasing identification with their suppliers. The alienation or even 
resentment became most apparent in municipalities located within a county which demonstrated a 
high preference for localness or greenness. This offered the neighboring MUs the opportunity to 
expand and increase their sales.  
Building on this evidence, we propose that the more a community (a county in this context) 
espouses localness and greenness, the higher the growth rate of an MU is expected: 
H2. Net of market concentration, the more the local community endorses localness and greenness, the 
higher the growth rate of the focal MU. 
Variations in organizational engagement 
Research on organizational identities suggests that the engagement of producers indicates a 
credible commitment towards the claimed identity should be rewarded by a target audience (Hannan 
et al., 2007; Hsu and Hannan, 2005; Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000). In our setting, cooperation 
among MUs represented a credible commitment to their collective identity. After deregulation, the 
Big Four NWUs emerged as a substantial threat to MUs. Due to MU’s prominent position in the retail 
market, NWUs attempted to lure MUs to “cooperate” with them. However, many MUs feared these 
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alliances as a direct threat to their identity. MUs perceived that they have “a fundamentally different 
organizational philosophy and mission” and felt deeply committed to their identity (Zeitung fuer 
Kommunale Wirtschaft, 2007). Therefore, MUs preferred to cooperate with each other. 
Cooperation among MUs not only suggested a credible commitment to the MU identity, it 
also serves to augment the salience of the MU identity in the eyes of audience members. Most  
cooperative activities placed an emphasis upon localness and greenness as key values to MUs. For 
instance, investments in power generation represented a genuine commitment to preserve local 
independence from NWUs and the development of environmentally friendly generation capacity 
(Energie & Management, 2005; Energie & Management, 2008). Or they stated that the goal behind 
the cooperation between the MUs in Krefeld and Neuss was “the maintenance of a customer-near, 
municipal oriented energy supply” (Energie & Management 2006). Similarly, the mission statement 
of KOS, a cooperation group of 14 MUs from Upper Bavaria and Swabia (KOS Web page), is “the 
development of the local economic and living environment for a strong and worth-living region… 
strengthening the economic independent future of the municipal companies in a changing energy 
market”. The municipal cooperation groups see themselves as “Robin Hood against the Big Four” 
(Zeitung fuer Kommunale Wirtschaft, 2006). Another example is the MU cooperation group named 
SüdWestStrom, aspires to the hope to “remain competitive and independent of the NWUs” 
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2008). The members of this cooperation group are committed to supporting their 
respective local communities through sponsoring local events, and more importantly, by building 
environmental-friendly power generation capacity (SüdWestStrom web page). Compared to MU’s 
well-received engagement, NWU’s efforts were perceived to lack credibility and authenticity in the 
eyes of local audience members. For example, EnBW conducted a costly campaign in the local press 
within the federal state of Baden-Württemberg, claiming local and environmental friendly 
investments. The director of MU Tübingen labelled this effort as inauthentic: “we pay dividend in 
Tübingen and not in Paris”, pointing to EnBW’s shareholder - the French nuclear giant EdF 
(Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2008). 
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Building upon these arguments, we propose that the more an MU engages in cooperative 
activities consistent with claims of localness and greenness, the greater its growth rate: 
H3. Net of market concentration, the more the focal MU engages in cooperative activities consistent 
with its claims of localness and greenness, the higher its growth rate. 
Identity matching and engagement jointly at work 
 Conceptually, matching and engagement represent two independent effects that influence the 
returns obtained from a collective identity (Hannan et al., 2007). The simultaneous existence of both 
conditions represents the ideal scenario for peripheral players. Indeed, the returns obtained from a 
claimed identity should be highest when both matching audience preferences and organizational 
engagement are non-zero. Engagement plays a crucial role in the relationship between matching and 
market success: the co-existence of a good match and credible engagement should boost the success 
of peripheral organizations. Similarly, matching should amplify the benefits obtained from 
engagement by making a good fit to local preferences even more convincing. Using an extreme 
example, consider that a large NWU invested a great deal of effort and money in extensive marketing 
campaigns to convince their target audience that the NWU has a local image. However, the lack of 
matching the perceived NWU identity to that of the preferences held by local audience members 
significantly hinders the returns obtained from the marketing campaign. Thus, we propose the 
following interaction between matching and engagement on MU’s growth rates: 
H4. Net of market concentration, the growth rate exhibited by the focal MU that engages in 
cooperative activities consistent with its claims of localness and greenness are amplified by 
the extent to which the local community values localness and greenness. 
Data and Methods 
Data Sources 
 To test our hypotheses we have compiled several datasets. The first data set relates to the 
annual electricity retail sales to household customer from 2001 to 2008 ― the period in which such 
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data are available. We focus on the household segment as the hypothesized effects should not apply to 
large commercial and industrial customers due to economic considerations, such as cost savings (see 
robustness check section). The data were primarily from the annual data of the BDEW (the umbrella 
trade association for the German electricity and water industry, BDEW Jahresdaten der 
Stromversorger, 2001-2008). The final data set consists of 573 MUs within the German electricity 
industry which corresponds to approximately 80% of the MU population.  
To measure the matching of MUs’ identity to audience preferences, we collected socio-
demographic statistics of 439 German counties from the German Federal Statistical Office. As for the 
identity claims of each MU, we obtained information on cooperative activities from the data collected 
by BDEW and VKU. To ensure the robustness of the information collected, we also consulted the 
websites of many MUs and cooperation groups, as well as various German national and local 
newspaper articles gathered through LexisNexis.  
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
 Because the market success of MUs is primarily concerned with the growth of incumbent 
organizations, the dependent variable of this study is the change in size of each MU in our sample. 
We measure Size using the retail sales of electricity to households in MWh (megawatt hour). Other 
common size measures are annual revenues and number of employees. The use of annual revenues 
from electricity retail sales was not feasible because electricity prices exhibited substantial volatility 
over the period of study (German Monopoly Commission, 2007). The number of employees turned 
out to be not suitable either because MUs are often involved in other business areas such as gas, water 
and heating and the allocation of employees to the different business areas is problematic.   
Independent Variables 
Competitive Release. Our argument about the disruption of the perceived unity of the market 
– i.e., regarding the cognitive split ― revolves around the failure of near-center producers. We 
measure competitive release through the amount of resources released by near-center producers 
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(Hannan et al., 2007), represented by the aggregated amount of sales to tariff customers freed by the 
failed regional utilities in a given year. Tariff customers include household customers and small 
commercial customers. The unit of measurement employed in the construction of this measure is 10 
million MWh (megawatt hour). 
Matching to local values and preferences. To test our second Hypothesis, we need to map the 
extent to which localness and greenness – i.e., the features of the MU identity ― are endorsed by the 
target audience of each MU. Remember that most MUs serve a local market. In particular, our 
qualitative evidence suggests that the primary audience of each MU belongs to a rather limited 
geographical space, namely to the several municipalities of a county. In particular, we expect the 
extent of localness and greenness exhibited by the inhabitants of the county to which each MU 
belongs to explain differences in market success among MUs.  
Localness was measured as the difference in voter turnout between county and national level 
elections in each county; Greenness as the proportion of people in a county voting for the German 
Green Party in the Bundestag (the lower house of the federal parliament) election. Bundestag 
elections are held every four years and linear interpolation was used for the missing years (see the 
robustness check section). Particular attention was dedicated towards assessing the validity of the 
measure of localness. Three main sources of variation may drive voter turnout (Blais, 2006, Geys, 
2006): (1) electoral institutions such as compulsory voting and unicameralism; (2) the specificity of 
party systems, and; (3) the socioeconomic environment. In Germany, because electoral institutions 
and party systems are similar across counties, variations in socioeconomic factors should provide the 
main source of variation in our context. When considering how differences in turnout are driven by 
socioeconomic factors, the following explanations are routinely advanced (Geys, 2006; Henderson 
and McEwen, 2009): (a) social pressure to participate, and; (b) a genuine attachment to the local 
community. Because there is no clear reason to believe that social pressures differ across national and 
local elections in a given county, any variation in the difference between local and national elections 
should capture the variation in the attachment of voters towards their local community. The results 
obtained when using the sheer percentage of voters in local elections proved to be consistent with 
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those reported in Table 3. As elections are held every 4 or 5 years, we filled the missing years through 
linear interpolation (see Boone et al, 2012; Schneiberg and Bartley, 2001)
1
.  
Engagement. Remember that market success should be larger for those MUs that credibly 
engage with their claimed identity. Our field study suggests that engaging in cooperative activities 
with other MUs represents a fundamental way to demonstrate commitment towards the claimed 
identity. Engagement in terms of cooperative activities among MUs took different forms (Zeitung fuer 
Kommunale Wirtschaft, 2001; Energie & Management, 2005; Energie & Management, 2008). If the 
focal MU engages in any cooperative activity that signals a commitment to Localness and/or 
Greenness, we coded the dummy variable Engagement as 1. Such activities include for example, 
collective marketing and sales, as well as the building of shared generation capacities. The latter 
represents the most genuine commitment to the MU identity in preserving local energy independence 
from NWUs. MUs’ collective marketing and sales efforts are also indicative of a credible engagement 
with the MU identity. For instance, after MU Wedel’s successful marketing campaign in Hamburg, 
MU Elmshorn and MU Schleswiger - two other members of the cooperation group Nordverbund, 
joined the battle of “David against Goliath” (Hamburg Abendblatt, 2008; taz, 2008). The three MUs 
expanded the campaign “Switch Electricity” (Wechselstrom in German) from Hamburg to their home 
federal state of Schelswig-Holstein, attacking the territory of E.ON Hanse – an NWU local subsidiary. 
Carrying out a marketing campaign together with the local bakeries, they emphasized their localness 
and independence, guaranteeing an offering to be “100% free of the energy giants”. With a surcharge 
of only 2 Euros per month they also actively promoted 100% green electricity. When an MU did not 
engage in any cooperative activity that signalled a commitment to localness and/or greenness, we 
coded the Engagement variable as zero. For instance, collective purchasing of electricity was also 
coded as zero, as being inspired by the willingness to increase their collective bargaining power, 
rather than by a genuine commitment to the MU identity. In the robustness check section, we discuss 
the results obtained from alternative coding strategies for the Engagement variable. All independent 
variables were lagged by one year. 
                                                          
1
 For the filling of missing years in-between elections, we also experimented with different discount rates, from 
fast to slow adjustments in the early years after an election. Although weaker in the case of the (less likely) fast 
adjustment, the results turned out to be qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3. 
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Control Variables 
Several control variables were included in our models to rule out alternative explanations. To 
hold constant the effects of market concentration, we controlled for the aggregated market share of the 
four largest firms in the industry (C4 Market Share). Linear interpolation was used for the year 2000. 
We also controlled for MU density and MU density squared at the state level (MU Density, MU 
Density
2
) because competition may negatively affect organizational growth (Barnett and Carroll, 
1987). Furthermore, the sales of electricity to household customers is proportional to the number of 
inhabitants of a given county and, indeed, densely populated areas are considered in the industry as 
profitable “fillet pieces” (Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2010). We thus created a control variable that 
measures the population of inhabitants per square kilometre (sqkm) in the focal county (Population 
Density). Since various socio-demographic characteristics might influence the consumption of 
electricity, we controlled for the average Population Age and Disposable Income observed in a given 
county (Tonn and Eisenberg, 2006; Hamza and Gilroy, 2011). In addition, the municipal debt level 
(Municipal Debt) in the focal county might be informative about the resourcefulness of the local 
institutional environment. To reduce the skewness of their distributions, we log-transformed several 
control variables (see Tables). Table 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics and bivariate 
correlations among the variables included in our database.   
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 & 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Model Specification 
 The most common model of organizational growth is the one proposed by Gibrat (1931) that 
presumes size-independent growth (Barnett and Carroll, 1987; Barron et al., 1995). Following 
previous studies (Sørensen, 1999; Greve, 2008), we model organizational growth rates as a function 
of organizational size and of a number of covariates: 
      
   
    
      (           ) 
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where S is firm size, α is an adjustment parameter indicating the dependence of growth on 
organizational size, and β is a vector of parameters characterizing the influence of organizational and 
environmental covariates. By transforming the equation into its natural logarithm, the following log-
linear model which can be estimated through linear regression: 
  (      )     (   )               
 Because the Hausman test rejected a random effects specification at p<0.0001, we employ 
fixed effect regression to isolate unobserved differences across MUs. Robust standard errors are 
reported to correct for potential biases due to heteroskedasticity.  
Results 
 Table 3 below, shows the estimates obtained from the fixed effects models of growth rates for 
MUs during the period 2001-2008. A few results from Model 1 are worth noting. First, the estimates 
of the controls appear aligned with our expectations: Population Age exhibits a negative and 
significant effect on growth rates. Increasing Disposable Income is instead positively associated with 
organizational growth rates. The effects of MU Density and MU Density
2
 are consistent with the 
existing evidence concerning the consequences of density-dependent legitimation and competition on 
organizational growth rates. C4 Market Concentration exhibits a positive and significant effect on 
MU growth ― a result aligned with the current understanding of resource partitioning. On a marginal 
note, consider that the coefficient of the lagged size variable is lower than the unit. We read this 
finding as suggesting that smaller MUs exhibited a faster growth compared to their larger  
counterparts.
2
  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Model 2 tests Hypothesis 1 concerning the consequences of Competitive Release while 
holding constant the effect of market concentration. The estimate of the Competitive Release variable 
                                                          
2
 This result should be interpreted with care as the coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent variable 
increases in magnitude when moving to alternative estimation methods such as FGLS or GEE. 
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(see H1) is positive, but marginally falls out of the conventional threshold of statistical significance (p 
= 0.109). Model 3 tests Hypothesis 2 on the impact of matching to local preferences. As predicted by 
our hypotheses, matching along each of the identity features of MUs (i.e., Localness and Greenness) 
provides an independent, positive and significant effect on MUs growth rates. H2 therefore is 
supported. Model 4 tests H3 by adding the Engagement variable. The coefficient estimate of this 
variable is positive and statistically significant: engagement activities that signal greater commitment 
to the claimed identity of MUs contributes to subsequent growth rates. Upon controlling for matching 
and engagement, the coefficient estimate of the Competitive Release variable becomes statistically 
significant, and similarly, it remains as such in the full model.
3
 As predicted by Hypothesis 4 (Model 
5), the joint presence of matching and engagement reinforces MUs growth rates – especially in the 
case of Localness although less so regarding Greenness (see Model 3). A graphical inspection of the 
interaction, not reported here, confirmed our interpretation. Notice also that when adding the 
interaction effect to our models, the main effect of engagement loses statistical significance. 
Consistent with our conceptual argument, this finding suggests that at the hypothetical value of zero 
intrinsic appeal, engagement does not exhibit any effect on organizational growth.  
Validity issues and robustness checks 
We carried out several additional analyses. A first set of checks concerned issues of internal 
validity. First, our theoretical arguments imply that the hypothesized effects apply to the household 
customer segment and not to the industrial and commercial customer segments. Additional tests 
reported in Table 4 below, confirm that the postulated effects appear either non-significant or even 
turn negative (see Greenness) when modelling the growth rates of MUs in the industrial and 
commercial segments. Second, our theoretical argument about MU identity as embedded in local 
communities (i.e., in a few neighboring municipalities) implies a decline in the returns when growth 
in geographical scope beyond their local environment is present. As spanning the boundaries of the 
home state represents a significant expansion of MUs and a potential threat to their claims of 
localness, we collected additional data to measure whether or not the focal MU sells electricity 
                                                          
3
 Analyses not reported here that included NWUs in the sample suggest that both types of organizations 
benefitted from competitive release. MUs however benefited (proportionally) the most from competitive release.   
   
 
 21 
outside their federal state. Less than 5% of MUs sell outside their federal state. By splitting the 
sample according to whether or not the focal MU sells electricity outside its home state, we obtained 
results consistent with our expectations: in the subsample of MUs that sell outside their state, 
localness and greenness are not statistically significant and engagement even exhibits a negative and 
significant effect on growth. Third, instead of a dummy variable coding, we recoded the Engagement 
variable by assigning a larger value to cooperative activities of increasing commitment to the MU 
identity, in accordance with the opinion of industrial experts (Energie & Management, 2005; Energie 
& Management, 2008). The results appear to be qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 3. 
Fourth, MU marketing efforts may increase the awareness among audience members of localness and 
greenness, leading them to vote and so support MUs. To attenuate this concern, we identified an 
ecological incident and used it as an instrument for capturing a quasi-exogenous rise in greenness: in 
2004, the Brunsbuettel nuclear power plant experienced a reactor shutdown due to a short circuit. We 
created a dummy variable coded 1 for all the MUs located within the same federal state of 
Brunsbuettel and for the year 2005 (immediately after the accident and the next election year) and 
2008 (our last year of observation and the year when public debate on the incident was reignited by 
the upcoming 2009 elections). We used this dummy variable to instrument Greenness by employing 
the Stata routine xtivreg fe. As the results reported in Table 5 illustrate, the beneficial effects of 
increases in Greenness for MUs growth hold in this model specification as well. The Brunsbuettel 
dummy works well in the first stage (positive, p<0.01). As the accident may have also ignited  a sense 
of localness among citizens and engagement with MUs, we used the same dummy variable to 
instrument Localness and Engagement as well. The result concerning localness is in line with our 
expectation – less so that concerning engagement. The Brunsbuettel dummy works as expected in the 
first stage in the case of Localness (positive, p<0.01) but not Engagement (p>0.1). While interesting, 
the results of these analyses should include two caveats: the Brunsbuettel accident was rather minor in 
magnitude and more severe ecological accidents took place outside our observation window; the 
results are also sensitive to the coding of the instruments and, therefore, not as stable as we wished. 
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 ----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 & 5 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
A second set of robustness checks regarded our model specification. Two main issues were 
potentially concerning: (i) our models included a lagged dependent variable and autocorrelation could 
affect the reported estimates  (Greene, 1997); (ii) cross-sectional correlation may exist in the growth 
of MUs. We checked the robustness of our results against these potential biases in various ways. 
Feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation seems a natural solution for the problem of 
cross-sectional and temporal correlation. However, the limits of FGLS are substantial (Beck and Katz 
1995). The method proposed by Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) overcomes many of the limitations of 
FGLS (Hoechle, 2007) while controlling for cross-sectional and temporal dependence in the context 
of a fixed effect estimator. We employed the xtscc routine available in Stata to re-estimate the models 
presented in Table 3. The results obtained from this procedure proved to be consistent with those 
reported in the paper. Moreover, the same estimation method was applied to the modelling of a 
dependent variable computed as the difference between the logs of contemporaneous and lagged size. 
The findings obtained from these additional models support the hypotheses advanced in this paper – 
except for H3 and for the fact that the effects of localness become weaker. Finally, the addition of the 
lagged dependent variable is a solution to the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, yet inferior to 
within estimation, dropping the lagged dependent variable from our fixed effects specification 
represents a possible remedy to both endogeneity and autocorrelation. Although this procedure alters 
the model (not a growth model) and the interpretation of results, it serves as an extreme test of the 
potential bias induced by the addition of the lagged DV. Besides H3 not receiving support the results 
of this extreme procedure appear aligned with those discussed in this paper.  
Last, additional qualitative evidence was collected to rule out alternative explanations. For 
example, customers may not necessarily prefer the identity of MUs, but their customized services 
(Boone et al., 2000). Data shows that approximately 70% of household customers never had direct 
contact with their electricity suppliers (BDEW household customer survey, 1999 to 2006). 
Furthermore, Figure 4 clearly indicates that private utilities such as NWUs are perceived as exhibiting 
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more “customer orientation” than MUs. The inertia in switching suppliers may well be another 
alternative explanation for the vitality of MUs. The BDEW household customer surveys (1999 to 
2006) indicate however, that this is not the case. The proportion of customers who did not switch 
suppliers because they “have a close relationship with my current supplier, which I do not want to 
give up” increased from 35% in 1999 to around 80% in 2001 and remained relatively stable 
afterwards. In contrast, the proportion of customer fearing “high efforts involved in switching” and 
“risk of lower supply security” has remained rather low, at around 40%. A final alternative 
explanation pertains to diseconomies of scale, i.e. NWUs did not bother to expand into MU territories 
because these markets are not sufficiently profitable. Converging evidence seems to point in the 
opposite direction. For instance, in 2008, the largest of the Big Four NWUs – E.ON attempted to lure 
MU customers by undercutting every local MU’s price of 1 cent/KWh (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 2007). 
The campaign did not prove to be successful, as confirmed by our interviews with industry experts. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper starts from a well-known premise of the sociology of markets literature: the 
structure and values endorsed by a social community contribute to alter market exchanges. In 
particular, we focused on the benefits accruing to peripheral organizations from claiming a distinct 
identity during the resource partitioning process. The results of our analyses suggest that the mass exit 
of regional utilities benefitted MUs by crystalizing the distinctiveness of their identity. Moreover, 
MUs located in communities, in which audience members endorsed their identity features and that 
engaged with their claimed identity, exhibited higher growth rates. The coexistence of identity 
matching and engagement produced the best market outcomes for MUs. We believe that the findings 
of this paper have profound implications for our understanding of the resource partitioning process 
and contribute to broaden the applicability of the theory to a wider set of contexts.  
Contributions to resource partitioning  
Three gaps in the resource partitioning literature were highlighted in the introduction of this 
paper. We now return to them in order to highlight our contribution. The first gap pertained to how 
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distinctions among classes of producers were crystallized in the eyes of audience members. Our 
source of inspiration was the qualitative evidence of Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) on the 
beneficial effects of a collective identity of peripheral producers – additional to those of market 
concentration. Further elaborating on the conditions under which peripheral producers reap the 
benefits of a collective identity is important because simulation experiments demonstrate that resource 
partitioning is likely to materialize only in environments marked by both strong scale economies and 
a sufficient distinction in preferences (Kovacs and Carroll, 2010). The case of German electricity 
represents an interesting puzzle to resource partitioning; strong scale economies do exist but the 
development of distinct preferences is hindered by the perceived homogeneity of electricity. In the 
presence of strong scale economies and undifferentiated preferences, existing research predicts the 
emergence of an oligopolistic market structure, rather than a dual market structure (Kovacs and 
Carroll, 2010;van Witteloostuijn and Boone, 2006). We interpret this puzzle as a precious opportunity 
to advance our understanding of the conditions that may lead to the consolidation of distinct 
preferences among audience members during the resource partitioning process. This paper is one of 
the first to show the effects of competitive release during resource partitioning. The fact that the 
effects of competitive release are traceable even when holding constant for market concentration, 
suggests that some interesting avenues of development for the theory exist. Exploring if collective 
identities sustain partitioning even in industries marked by limited scale economies (Reis et al., 2013) 
would be especially interesting to clarify the scope conditions of the theory.  
The second gap that inspired this paper was the lack of attention to matching between the 
identity claims of peripheral producers and preferences of the target audience. We addressed this gap 
by relying on recent developments in organization theory concerning the effects of matching and 
engagement (Hannan et al., 2007; Hsu et al., 2009). By highlighting variations in the endorsement by 
audience members and the engagement of producers, our paper contributes to the literature by 
providing a novel approach to explore differences in performance among peripheral producers during 
the partitioning process. Because of our conceptual focus on audience members and matching 
producers’ identities, we collected data on both organizations (in the case of engagement) and the 
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preferences of audience members (concerning matching). In so doing, our paper moves the locus of 
attention of partitioning studies from differences in product space to the consideration of differences 
in organizational identities in the eyes of audience members. The empirical context chosen is ideal in 
order to address the third gap reported in the introduction because several alternative explanations 
(e.g., status consumption or product preferences) can be held constant. We believe that the shift is 
necessary and important: it not only provides more realism to the theory of partitioning (i.e., audience 
members control the resources crucial for organizational success, Hannan et al., 2007); but, more 
importantly, it contributes to deepen our understanding of the sociological – rather than the purely 
economic ― forces that sustain partitioning.  
We believe that the results of our paper contribute to expanding the agenda of resource 
partitioning. We see various areas of development for our work. For example, our focus on distinct 
producer identities as triggers of partitioning extends the applicability of the theory to a larger set of 
markets – including those where concentration does not increase. As Carroll (1985: 1264) pointed out, 
concentration is an important but not sufficient condition for partitioning. To understand why market 
concentration alone is unlikely to create distinctions among classes of producers, consider the 
following numerical example. The market center consists of 10 large firms each with 5% market share 
and 10 smaller ones each with 2% (70 % in total). The near-center segment includes 100 firms each 
with 0.2% (20% in total). The periphery is populated by 1,000 firms, each with 0.01% (10% in total). 
Now imagine two stylized scenarios: (i) market concentration increases but competitive release and 
cognitive split in audience’s mind fails to take place, or; (ii) market concentration remains stable, but 
competitive release and cognitive split in the perception of audience members takes place. According 
to the first scenario, due to scale-based competition, the 10 smaller center firms with a total market 
share of 20% are acquired by the 10 larger center firms, while the near-center and periphery remain 
unchanged. This is plausible since during industry consolidation, organizational mortality decreases 
with increasing distance of position away from the market center (Dobrev et al., 2002). As a result, 
market concentration increases but competitive release does not take place. The market picture 
perceived by audience members remains uninterrupted due to the continuous existence of the near-
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center organizations. Unless the consolidation expands further to the near-center segment, the identity 
mechanism is unlikely to unfold. In the second scenario, the near-center segment experiences a total 
demise. Of their 20% market share, 10% is swallowed by the 10 smaller centre firms, boosting each 
of their market shares from 2% to 3%. This may make sense for instance, if the regulators limit 
mergers and acquisition (M&As) involving the largest players, but are more lenient towards smaller 
center firms. The other 10% is absorbed by the periphery, boosting each of their market share from 
0.01% to 0.02%. Only in this second scenario does competitive release takes place and the identity 
mechanism is activated. Notice however, that market concentration remains unchanged. 
These simple numerical examples lie at the basis of our decision to focus on the effects of 
competitive release and identity matching while holding constant market concentration. The increase 
in the magnitude of the coefficient of market concentration upon controlling for the effects of identity 
(compare Model 1 to Model 2-5) is however interesting and suggests a potential underlying 
relationship among these forces. The study of the nature of this relationship was not the object of this 
paper and remains to be explored. As far as we can ascertain, two possible relationships appear 
consistent with our findings; the beneficial effects of market concentration could be amplified by the 
consolidation of a collective identity among peripheral organizations (i.e., moderation); alternatively, 
the effects of market concentration may directly affect the market success of peripheral organizations 
but also indirectly contribute to the consolidation of a collective identity (i.e., mediation). Exploratory 
analyses suggest that a moderation effect is not at work in our data. None of the interaction effects 
between market concentration and either competitive release or identity matching/engagement proved 
to be statistically significant. Instead, market concentration appears to significantly influence the 
mechanism of identity – and, in particular, the extent of competitive release observed. While only 
exploratory, these analyses point to an interesting avenue of development for our paper. Pursuing a 
thorough investigation of the relationship between market concentration and identity would be 
welcome to enrich our understanding of resource partitioning.  
Recall also that our study focuses on a dependent variable relatively novel to the partitioning 
literature – i.e., organizational growth rates (Boone et al., 2002). As in this context the success of 
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peripheral producers primarily involved incumbent organizations, our choice was driven by empirical 
considerations. However, we believe that organizational growth may “extend the known implications 
of the theory by pushing it into a new domain” (Kovacs and Carroll, 2010: 57) and represents an 
interesting outcome for approaching novel questions concerning, for instance, the durability of 
resource partitioning (Pólos et al., 2010). Clearly, a reiterated and diffused growth of peripheral 
organizations may challenge the preservation of their image of ‘small’ and ‘authentic’ producers. The 
results of our additional analyses further confirm that MUs were rewarded for their identity and 
engagement only when these organizations remained anchored to a confined geographical locale. We 
read this finding as suggesting that, to avoid the potential pitfalls of growth, peripheral organizations 
are required to remain consistent with the underlying values that define their collective identity. Does 
the constrained growth of incumbent organizations favour the emergence of new entrants? And, more 
broadly, under which conditions new entrants or incumbents may appropriate the benefits of resource 
partitioning? We look forward to seeing research that addresses these questions.   
Generalizability and potential limitations 
While aware of the limitations of focusing on a single industry, we believe that the results of 
this paper are not idiosyncratic to the empirical context chosen and, instead, they contribute to extend 
the reach of resource partitioning theory. Various authors have already highlighted that market 
exchanges assume meaning and substance thanks to the attributions and motivations of social agents 
(Appadurai, 1986: 4, Zelizer, 1994; Simmel, 1900). Kopytoff (1986) for instance, argued that the 
same object of transaction can move smoothly between the two spheres of commoditization and 
singularization depending on the social actors involved in the transaction. Our paper shows that – very 
much like consumer goods --, commodities are imbued with meanings and values. We expect the 
identity mechanism to play an even greater role in industries marked by more differentiated products, 
such as newspapers (Carroll, 1985), banking (Lomi, 1995), beer (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000), 
wine (Swaminathan, 1995, 2001) and auditing (Boone et al., 2001). In these contexts, we expect 
public consumption and product differentiation to amplify the returns from collective identities. 
Consider also that identity differences among producers are becoming a critical mechanism of 
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differentiation in many markets. The growing commoditization of products and the commercialization 
of societies contributes to standardize, homogenize, and rationalize market exchanges (for a 
discussion see Davenport, 2005), and to extend utilitarian markets to every corner of our social life. 
Elaborating on the conditions under which the returns from a collective identity are appropriated is 
thus important to extend the applicability of resource partitioning to novel markets not necessarily 
marked by strong scale economies, but by the substantial standardization and homogenization of the 
offerings in the eyes of audience members (Reis et al., 2013; Hannan, 1979).  
 These reflections on generalizability should not be read as suggesting that our research 
context is immune from limitations. Revolving around a homogeneous good, the market for electricity 
is exposed to stronger and faster effects of competitive release because incumbents can easily poach 
the consumers of failed regional producers. Eventually, the rapid demise of regional producers was 
conducive to a swift consolidation of a distinct identity among peripheral organizations. In other 
markets, the effects of competitive release may be slowed down by the ability of near-center 
producers to exist for longer, thanks to the loyalty of their consumers. The relevance of the speed of 
competitive release for the effectiveness of the identity mechanism remains to be explored. A final 
potential limitation concerns the presence of various preferences within local communities. Indeed, 
the preferences of audience members may be numerous and partially divergent -- even within a 
confined geographical locale. For example, the communities receptive to localness and greenness may 
also endorse reliability, equality and individualism. As matching to audience preferences can unfold 
along various dimensions, what role does coherence among identity dimensions play in sustaining the 
market success of peripheral producers? We believe that addressing these limitations holds the 
promise of further improving our understanding of resource partitioning and, more broadly, of the 
processes of differentiation and competition within modern markets.   
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FIGURE 1 
Number of Regional Utilities in German Electricity Industry 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Oppositional Identities of NWU vs. MU 
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FIGURE 3 
The NWUs representing the confusing market (left side) and  
“own municipal utilities” (right side) (Source: ifm 2006) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
Customers’ images of MUs and private utilities (Source: TNS Emnid survey 2009) 
 
 
 
46% 
35% 
30% 
19% 
8% 
6% 
9% 
9% 
12% 
16% 
20% 
28% 
35% 
37% 
45% 
45% 
0% 20% 40% 60%
profit orientation
flexibilty
customer orientation
good value for money
environmental friendliness
security and relaibility
support for the local region
orientation on common welfare of the…
MUs
Private Utilities
   
 
 36 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      1.Size (log) 4188.00 10.46 1.28 2.94 14.94 
2. Lagged size (log) 4187.00 10.47 1.29 2.94 15.67 
3. Localness 5638.00 -0.21 0.07 -0.39 0.09 
4. Greenness 6198.00 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.23 
5. Engagement 6303.00 0.38 0.48 0.00 1.00 
6. Competitive release 6303.00 0.42 0.56 0.00 1.40 
7. C4 market share 5730.00 0.48 0.11 0.25 0.59 
8. Population age (log) 6280.00 3.74 0.04 3.61 3.89 
9. Population density (log) 6248.00 5.51 0.93 3.66 8.35 
10. MU density (log) 6303.00 4.17 0.69 0.69 5.04 
11. MU Density
2
/1000 6303.00 8.52 8.34 0.00 23.72 
12. Disposable income (log) 6061.00 9.71 0.14 9.29 10.16 
13. Municipal debt (log) 6224.00 11.96 0.72 7.27 15.04 
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TABLE 2 
Bivariate Correlations 
     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
  1.Size (log) 1.00 
             2. Lagged size (log) 0.97 1.00 
            3. Localness -0.36 -0.36 1.00 
           4. Greenness 0.29 0.29 -0.40 1.00 
          5. Engagement -0.05 -0.05 0.18 0.03 1.00 
         6. Competitive release 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 1.00 
        7. C4 market share 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 
       8. Population age (log) 0.08 0.08 -0.17 -0.28 -0.15 -0.23 -0.14 1.00 
      9. Population density (log) 0.62 0.62 -0.53 0.53 -0.07 0.01 0.00 0.09 1.00 
     10. MU density (log) -0.02 -0.02 0.42 0.24 0.23 0.00 -0.01 -0.49 0.08 1.00 
    11. MU Density2/1000 -0.07 -0.07 0.61 0.05 0.21 -0.01 -0.01 -0.36 -0.04 0.90 1.00 
   12. Disposable income (log) 0.12 0.12 -0.08 0.58 0.08 -0.17 -0.15 -0.25 0.36 0.54 0.37 1.00 
  13. Municipal debt (log) 0.31 0.31 -0.29 0.28 -0.11 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.33 -0.02 -0.15 0.16 1.00 
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TABLE 3 
Fixed Effects Models of Growth Rates of the MUs, 2001-2008 
(MU Size in Household Customer Segment) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Controls H1 H2 H3 H4 
      
Lagged Size (log) 0.24512*** 0.24593*** 0.39606** 0.39580** 0.39519** 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.158) (0.158) (0.157) 
Population Age (log) -1.77671** -1.29967* -1.23998* -1.25788* -1.26672* 
 (0.752) (0.672) (0.676) (0.683) (0.745) 
Population Density (log) 0.01717 0.08821 -0.33528 -0.34471 -0.44902 
 (0.274) (0.251) (0.410) (0.412) (0.447) 
MU Density 0.76584** 0.73852* 1.04409** 1.05012** 1.02304** 
 (0.387) (0.378) (0.480) (0.481) (0.481) 
MU Density
2
/1000 -0.01770* -0.01619* -0.02655** -0.02670** -0.02641** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Disposable Income (log) 0.85780*** 0.89645*** 0.42869** 0.41063** 0.38054* 
 (0.268) (0.277) (0.195) (0.196) (0.197) 
Municipal Debt (log) 0.01228 0.00997 -0.00704 -0.00792 -0.01050 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
C4 Market Share 0.19840* 0.28737** 0.30550** 0.30340** 0.31107** 
 (0.111) (0.136) (0.134) (0.134) (0.135) 
Competitive Release  0.01990 0.02394* 0.02456* 0.02342* 
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Localness   1.03116* 1.02191* 0.60071 
   (0.528) (0.527) (0.379) 
Greenness   1.75272* 1.84540* 1.23200 
   (0.982) (0.992) (1.097) 
Engagement    0.02863* 0.19884 
    (0.016) (0.167) 
LocalnessXEngagement     1.00700* 
     (0.608) 
GreennessXEngagement     0.90434 
     (0.704) 
Constant 2.77112 0.27923 4.45752* 4.71997* 5.70650** 
 (1.816) (2.435) (2.626) (2.666) (2.774) 
      
Observations 3,388 3,388 3,224 3,224 3,224 
R-squared 0.072 0.072 0.169 0.169 0.171 
Number of firm 540 540 532 532 532 
df_m 7 8 10 11 13 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 4 
Robustness Check: Identity Effects do not Apply to Industrial & Commercial Customers 
(MU Size in Industrial & Commercial Customer Segment) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Controls H1 H2 H3 H4 
      
Lagged Size (log) 0.30029*** 0.30110*** 0.31242*** 0.31182*** 0.31251*** 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) 
Population Age (log) 0.66821 1.78870 2.28986 2.42239 1.57215 
 (1.982) (2.035) (2.173) (2.191) (2.300) 
Population Density (log) -0.30573 -0.14368 -0.56790 -0.54123 -0.51927 
 (0.703) (0.706) (0.826) (0.829) (0.871) 
MU Density -0.34697 -0.42179 -0.88050 -0.88931 -0.79006 
 (1.167) (1.166) (1.390) (1.393) (1.387) 
MU Density
2
/1000 -0.01564 -0.01177 0.00635 0.00665 0.00400 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Disposable Income (log) -1.89834** -1.79841** -1.52949* -1.49829* -1.21847 
 (0.824) (0.830) (0.903) (0.905) (0.938) 
Municipal Debt (log) -0.06919 -0.07443 -0.11010 -0.10909 -0.10675 
 (0.095) (0.095) (0.113) (0.112) (0.112) 
C4 Market Share -0.68277** -0.46813 -0.29945 -0.28960 -0.29690 
 (0.320) (0.346) (0.399) (0.400) (0.400) 
Competitive Release  0.04701** 0.03328 0.03101 0.02580 
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Localness   1.18264 1.22990 0.67129 
   (1.179) (1.180) (1.252) 
Greenness   -9.57769** -9.87811** -7.29868 
   (4.496) (4.515) (4.825) 
Engagement    -0.11238 0.61326 
    (0.079) (0.454) 
LocalnessXEngagement     1.13229 
     (1.555) 
GreennessXEngagement     -5.33823 
     (3.809) 
Constant 27.37759*** 21.51078** 22.35578** 21.52016** 21.07214** 
 (8.567) (9.015) (8.716) (8.788) (8.997) 
Observations 3,137 3,137 3,000 3,000 3,000 
R-squared 0.085 0.086 0.096 0.097 0.099 
Number of firm 522 522 515 515 515 
df_m 7 8 10 11 13 
      
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 5 
Robustness Check: Instrumental Variable Estimation Leveraging the Brunsbuettel Incident 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES MU Size (log) MU Size (log) MU Size (log) 
    
Lagged Size (log) 0.24571*** 0.39472*** 0.16825 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.130) 
Population Age (log) -1.24163 -1.20047 -5.77395 
 (0.934) (0.904) (7.268) 
Population Density (log) 0.11798 -0.45316 -2.92683 
 (0.408) (0.439) (4.527) 
MU Density 1.53909*** 0.91868*** 0.76630 
 (0.448) (0.324) (1.346) 
MU Density
2
/1000 -0.04628*** -0.02229* 0.00738 
 (0.017) (0.013) (0.063) 
Disposable Income (log) 0.08351 0.49779 -2.33497 
 (0.445) (0.368) (4.738) 
Municipal Debt (log) 0.03204 -0.01132 -0.21575 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.356) 
C4 Market Share 0.14739 0.36151** 0.43294 
 (0.181) (0.175) (0.713) 
Competitive Release 0.02804** 0.02319* 0.18550 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.239) 
Greenness 9.72664***   
 (3.506)   
Localness  1.46535*  
  (0.881)  
Engagement   7.78988 
   (10.963) 
Constant 3.78608 5.04096 64.40502 
 (3.941) (4.277) (91.427) 
    
Observations 3,358 3,224 3,388 
R-squared    
Number of firm 540 532 540 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
